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PREEMPTIVE STRIKES ON STATE AUTONOMY: 
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
24 
Exactly two hundred years ago this week, on February 21, 
1787, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution calling for a 
Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation. The work of 
the Convention was completed at Philadelphia seven months later, 
on September 17, 1787. On that day, the Framers signed the 
enduring document we celebrate and re-examine during this 
Bicentennial Year. It was no easy task to convince the citizens 
of the several states, during the ratification process, that the 
new Constitution did not pose a threat to their newly-won 
independence. Fearing that a powerful central government merely 
would replicate the arbitrary ways of the British Crown, many saw 
greater detriment than benefit in the formation of a "more 
perfect Union."l 
One of the provisions of the proposed Constitution that 
caused the citizenry some concern was the portion of Article VI 
that has come to be known as the Supremacy Clause: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thinq in the Constitution or Law of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.2 
Writing as Publius in No. 33 of the Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton sought to dispel the People's fears that the 
Supremacy Clause would lead to an erosion of their rights as 
citizens of the several states. Hamilton wrote that a larger 
political society composed of a number of smaller ·political 
societies would amount to nothing if its laws were not supreme; 
he pointed out, however, that the larger society should be 
treated as a usurper when it acts in excess of its constitutional 
powers and invades the residuary authority of the smaller 
societies.3 According to Hamilton, only those laws based on "the 
enumerated and legitimate objects" of federal jurisdiction would 
be accorded the dignity of "SUPREME LAW of the land."4 
Obviously, Hamilton's assurances were based on his concept 
that the national government was to be one of limited powers, 
that all other governmental authority remained in the states, and 
that any incursion into the residual authority of the states 
would be considered an illegal encroachment. James Madison used 
these words to describe his view of the division of 
responsibility: "The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous 
and indefinite."S The Federalists clearly were confident that 
the enumerated powers, specific and defined, would serve as a 
significant limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 
What they did not foresee, of course, was the expansive 
interpretation of the enumerated powers that would be provided by 
the third branch of government. 
It was in fact the Anti-Federalists who anticipated that the 
Judiciary would be called upon to referee the frequent disputes 
that inevitably would arise under the Supremacy Clause. The 
Anti-Federalists predicted that the federal courts, by reason of 
their authority to decide when state law is preempted by federal 
law under the Supremacy Clause, would be the instruments by which 
state power would be reduced to naught. An article in the Essays 
of Brutus series published on February 14, 1788, urging rejection 
of the proposed Constitution, anticipated that ratification would 
spawn the following developments: adoption of federal laws 
duplicative of state laws in areas where state and federal 
jurisdiction is concurrent; extension of central government 
operations into those areas; and federal court condonation of 
these enlarged activities by liberal construction of the powers 
of the central government. As a result, according to Brutus, the 
rights of the states to act would be diminished to the point of 
"becoming so trifling and unimportant as not to be worth 
having."6 It is generally thought that Brutus was Robert Yates, 
a New York judge who was a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention.7 Yates left the convention before the Constitution 
was completed and later wrote to Governor Clinton that he opposed 
"the consolidation of the United States into one government."8 
Although the dire predictions of the Anti-Federalists have 
not entirely come to pass, some of the problems they foresaw two 
hundred years ago are with us today. Certainly, the Supreme 
Court has approved the exercise of broad-ranging federal 
authority, despite the limited powers envisioned by the Framers. 
This, of course, has allowed the central.government to act in 
many areas originally thought to be primarily of state concern. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court increasingly has been called upon, 
in cases where state and federal legislation affect the same 
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subject matter, to decide whether the state activity has been 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. I propose in this Lecture 
to reveal the confusion and inconsistency of the Courts when 
faced with issues of statutory preemption. I also propose to 
show the consequent need for Congress to play a more active role 
in defining the scope of permissible state activity and in 
preserving the constitutional framework of federalism. It seems 
to me that the obligation of Congress to assure the states a 
proper range of governmental operations is implicated in the duty 
of the legislative branch recently described by the Attorney 
General -- the duty to interpret the Constitution in the course 
of performing its official functions.9 Actually, the Attorney 
General said that this interpretive function is vested in all 
three branches, and I certainly do not mean to say that the 
executive and judicial branches have no part to play in the 
preservation of our federal system. My contention is that 
Congress, by being alert to preemption problems, can play a 
vitally important role in the protection of state autonomy. 
Indeed, as the branch of government closest to the People, 
Congress has a positive duty in this regard. I shall have some 
suggestions and recommendations on how that duty can best be 
fulfilled at the conclusion of this discussion. 
The Supremacy Clause was tested ear~y on in a case arising 
out of the War of 1812. The State of Pennsylvania had enacted a 
statute providing for a state court-martial of members of the 
militia who failed to obey a call to service by the President of 
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the United States. The penalties provided were those prescribed 
by federal law for the same offense. In upholding the 
jurisdiction of the state court-martial, Justice Bushrod 
Washington, writing for the Supreme Court majority, found it 
sufficient that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the 
state and federal governments was authorized by the laws of the 
state and not prohibited by the laws of the United States.lO 
Although he found no repugnance between the two statutes in the 
case before him, he speculated that the will of congress could be 
"thwarted and opposed" even if it were possible to comply with 
state law without violating the requirements of a federal 
statute.ll Justice Story, in dissent, declared the narrower rule 
that in cases of concurrent authority, state laws would yield to 
federal laws on the same subject only in cases of "direct and 
manifest collision" and then only to the extent that they were 
incompatible.l2 Curiously, Story found the Pennsylvania Militia 
Act wholly incompatible with federal statutes relating to the 
same subject. 
When Aaron Ogden sued Thomas Gibbons to enjoin the operation 
of steamboat service between Elizabethtown, New Jersey and New 
York City, he relied upon his ownership by assignment of the 
exclusive rights of navigation originally granted to Robert R. 
Livingston and Robert Fulton by the New York legislature. 
In defense, Gibbons contended that his ships were duly enrolled 
and licensed for the coastal trade under an Act of Congress 
adopted in 1793, and that his rights to navigate the waters in 
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question overrode the exclusive franchise granted by the state 
legislature. The Supreme Court agreed with Gibbons and reversed 
a judgment by New York's highest court in favor of Ogden. In an 
opinion written by John Marshall in 1824 echoing the Story 
dissent in the militia case, the Court held that its inquiry was 
limited to the question of "whether the laws of New York, as 
expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their 
application to this case, come into collision with an Act of 
Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act 
entitles him."l3 Having found such a collision, the Court 
perceived no difficulty in concluding that the Act of Congress 
was supreme and that "the law of the state, though enacted in the 
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it."l4 In the 
opinion, the Great Chief Justice wrote that "the framers of our 
constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, 
by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws 
made in pursuance of it."l5 
There you have it -- a succinct statement of the doctrine of 
preemption as dictated by the Supremacy Clause. The elements 
necessary to invoke the doctrine were made clear: a state law 
enacted in the exercise of the sovereign powers reserved to the 
states; a federal law enacted by Congress within the enumerated 
legislative authority granted by the Constitution; and an actual, 
not theoretical, collision between the two. Simply put, state 
and federal statutes, though both be otherwise valid, cannot 
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occupy the same space at the same time and the state provision 
must yield. 
Despite the elegance and lucidity of the Gibbons opinion and 
the clear rule it established, some actual collision cases 
continue to be litigated and to find their way to the Supreme 
Court. In 1962, the Court was presented with a clear collision 
between a state community property rule and federal provisions 
governing joint ownership of U.S. Savings Bonds.l6 The federal 
provisions of course prevailed. And in 1977, one hundred 
fifty-three years after Gibbons, in a case involving issues 
virtually identical to those confronted in Gibbons, federal 
licenses covering mackerel fishery were held to prevail over 
Virginia statutes limiting the fishing rights of non-residents.l7 
These later cases may be more of a tribute to the fact that 
nothing can forestall litigation or impair the tenacity of 
lawyers in our nation than to the enigmatic nature of the 
precedent. 
Unhappily, preemption jurisprudence no longer is confined to 
questions of actual collision. The wide-ranging inquiry proposed 
by Justice Washington now has become the standard. In the name 
of the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court now examines state law 
to determine whether it is somehow inconsistent with the purposes 
of federal law or is incompatible with a. federal regulatory 
scheme or interferes in some way with federal policy. In a case 
holding that the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939 was 
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preempted by the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, the 
Court described the expanded scope of its inquiry as follows: 
This Court, in considering the validity of state 
laws in the light of . . . federal laws touching the 
same subject, has made use of the following 
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the 
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; 
inconsistency; violationt curtailment and interference. 
But none of these expressions provides an infallible 
constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional 
yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one 
crystal clear distinctly marked formula.l8 
The lack of a clear yardstick or formula has fostered the 
development of preemption jurisprudence on a case by case, 
statute by statute basis, devoid of analytic consistency and 
lacking in doctrinal intelligibility. It is difficult to 
disagree with the commentators who have written that the Supreme 
court's preemption decisions "have often produced considerable 
confusion and criticism"l9 and that "[p]erhaps the most 
troublesome aspect of the doctrine of federal preemption has been 
its historically inconsistent application."20 
The confusion and inconsistency are especially troublesome 
in light of the fact that preemption litigation has involved so 
many diverse areas of law and therefore has resulted in the 
displacement of numerous state regulations clearly adopted in the 
pursuit of legitimate state objectives. In the Alien 
Registration case I referred to earlier, the Court held that a 
state statute requiring aliens to register and to carry a card to 
exhibit to police on demand was preempted by a federal statute 
requiring registration but not the carrying of a card. While 
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there obviously was no collision in the Gibbons v. Ogden sense, 
or even an actual conflict between the two statutes, the Court 
held that Congress had occupied the field of alien registration, 
adverting to the supremacy of national power in the general area 
of foreign affairs, including power over immigration and 
naturalization.21 The Court saw the state law as an obstacle 
blocking the achievement of congressional goals, although it is 
difficult to see how this was so. At any rate, there was no 
question that the state statute represented a proper exercise of 
the state's police power. 
The occupation of the field test, as applied in the Alien 
Registration case and in other cases, has been criticized for 
leaving open a number of questions: What standards should be 
applied in determining whether Congress has in fact occupied a 
field? Are there good reasons for finding exclusive federal 
occupancy? What are the boundaries of the specific field under 
examination?22 It seems to me that in applying the occupation of 
the field test and some of the other tests it developed to decide 
preemption issues, the Supreme Court has involved itself 
unnecessarily with policy problems whose solution is best left to 
the other branches. Whether it is preferable that there be 
national uniformity in one area or another is not for a court to 
determine. 
It seems quite unexceptional to say that when it is not 
physically impossible for one engaged in interstate commerce to 
comply with both state and federal regulations, the state 
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regulation is not preempted. This, in fact, was the principle 
underlying the decision upholding different maturity standards 
established by the state of California and the federal government 
to keep prematurely harvested avocados from the market. The 
Court found that there was no preemption because there was "no 
inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation, 
despite the dissimilarity of the standards."23 The fact that the 
two schemes had the same objectives was not held to be 
controlling. 
Yet a California labelling statute, imposing requirements 
more stringent than those imposed by federal law with respect to 
weight variations due to moisture loss in flour, was found to be 
preempted.24 The rationale there was that the purposes and 
objectives of Congress could not be accomplished and executed 
unless packages bearing the same indicated weight contained the 
same quantity of the product. The purpose of the federal 
statute, according to Justice Thurgood Marshall, who authored the 
opinion, was to facilitate value comparisons by consumers 
throughout the country. It is difficult to discern just how 
there would be a problem with value comparisons when the state 
regulation was more strict than the federal. It is especially 
difficult to reconcile this case with the avocado case, since 
compliance with both flour labelling schemes was not a "physical 
impossibility." Despite the dissimilarity of standards, there 
was no inevitable collision between them because flour 
manufacturers, knowing where their product is to be shipped, 
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could pack and label to comply with state law as well as federal. 
The physical impossibility test, certainly, has not been 
consistent in its application. 
According to another test developed by the Supreme Court, 
state regulation is preempted where Congress has legislated so 
comprehensively that no room remains for the states to supplement 
federal law. This rule controlled the disposition of a case 
known as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,25 and later Supreme 
Court cases have cited Rice as authority for the rule. A close 
examination of Rice, however, reveals that there was perhaps some 
room the Court overlooked and that the displacement of state 
regulation there was another instance of policy choice. The case 
involved the regulation of grain warehouses under the Federal 
Warehouse Act and under certain provisions of Illinois law 
governing grain storage and storage charges. Although the 
federal regulatory scheme was a generalized one, revolving around 
the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to issue and 
suspend warehouse licenses, and the state scheme was a 
particularized one, establishing specific warehouse standards and 
providing for rate regulation, the federal scheme was held to 
displace the state's entirely. The Court found that the federal 
Act had been amended specifically to remedy past problems arising 
from a system of dual regulation. Having so found, the Court 
ignored the areas apparently open to state regulation and leaped 
to the conclusion that "the federal scheme prevails though it is 
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a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the 
State."26 
Justice Frankfurter, in a compelling dissent, disagreed, with 
the proposition that Congress could, by merely touching a subject 
matter, render it untouchable by a state "though there is neither 
paper nor operating conflict between federal and State spheres of 
authority."27 Accordingly, he rejected the Court's conclusion 
that the federal Act inferentially deprived Illinois of a 
rate-fixing authority exercised over a period of seventy years 
while not conferring such authority on any federal agency. 
Frankfurter declared that the authority of states under the 
reserved powers always should survive "unless Congress has 
clearly swept the Boards of all State authority, or the State's 
claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has 
ordered."28 It seems that the "no room available" test is open 
to interpretation as well. 
The Supreme Court has taught us that "[t]he critical 
question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress 
intended that federal regulation supersede state law."29 The 
confusing and inconsistent rules and tests I have been discussing 
all were designed to divine congressional intent, express or 
implied. The word "divine" seems appropriate here, because its 
dictionary definitions include: to guess.; to know by 
inspiration, intuition or reflection; and to locate water with a 
divining rod.30 All these synonyms are applicable to the manner 
in which the Court attempts to ascertain congressional intent to 
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preempt. An expression of intent in explicit statutory language, 
however, should be conclusive. Unfortunately, it is not. 
An express provision for the maintenance of state jurisdiction 
was defeated in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,31 a celebrated case in 
preemption jurisprudence. In that case a state's Sedition Act 
was held to be displaced by the federal Smith Act, which 
prohibited the overthrow of the United States government by force 
or violence. That determination was made in the face of a 
specific savings clause prohibiting the impairment of the 
criminal jurisdiction established under the laws of the several 
states.32 It is also noteworthy that Congressman Howard Smith, 
sponsor of the Smith Act, wrote a vehement denial "that Congress 
ever had the faintest notion of nullifying the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the respective sovereign states."33 The 
preemption determination in Nelson was bottomed on the conclusion 
that the Smith Act was intended to "occupy the field of 
sedition."34 
Having previously written of my apprehensions regarding the 
nationalization of criminal law,35 I pause here to note that, in 
addition to the general savings provision ignored in Nelson, 
several statutes defining federal crimes include their own 
provisions saving state jurisdiction.36 One commentator, 
expressing a concern for double prosecution and punishment, 
suggests that unless the Supreme Court decision holding double 
jeopardy inapplicable in the case of state and federal 
prosecutions for the same conduct37 is re-examined, or 
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legislation is adopted to provide that a state or federal trial 
bars prosecution in the other jurisdiction, "a finding of 
congressional intent to pre-empt is the only way to protect the 
defendant from the rigors of double prosecution."38 I do not 
know how such a finding is possible when there is an express 
savings clause, although the Supreme Court certainly overcame 
that problem in Nelson. My own view is that the federal 
government generally should get out of the business of defining 
and prosecuting crimes primarily of state and local concern. 
Federal criminal prosecution should be limited to misconduct 
affecting clearly defined national interests. 
Just as there are explicit savings clauses in federal 
legislation expressing the intent of Congress to preserve state 
jurisdiction, so are there explicit supersedure clauses 
expressing the intent to preempt state jurisdiction. I have 
given an example of how the former has been ignored, and I now 
present an example of the disregard of the latter. The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 includes a provision that 
the Act "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employment benefit plan"39 
described in the Act. There was no dispute that "employee 
benefit plan" included any plan, fund or program established to 
provide vacation benefits. The plaintiffs in a case known as 
California Hospital Association v. Henning40 sought a declaration 
that the clear preemption provision superseded a California state 
policy barring forfeiture of vacation benefits and requiring 
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payment of a pro rata share of such benefits upon termination of 
employment. The plaintiffs maintained benefit plans in 
contravention of the California policy. In denying preemption, 
the Ninth Circuit court of Appeals interpreted the Act to apply 
only to funded vacation plans and not to traditional payroll 
payments of vacation wages from general funds. The decision has 
been criticized, of course, on the ground that it was for 
Congress, not the courts, to restrict the coverage provided by 
the Act.41 
Clear expressions of intent found in the legislative history 
also have been ignored by the courts. In Burbank v. Lockheed Air 
Terminal,42 the Court found that a city ordinance prohibiting the 
take-off of pure jet aircraft during certain hours was preempted 
by federal statutes regulating aircraft noise. The Court relied 
upon what it referred to as the "pervasive nature" of the 
regulatory scheme.43 The dissenting opinion, however, referred 
to specific legislative history demonstrating congressional 
intent to restrict the applicability of the federal legislation 
to overflying aircraft and to permit local control of the type 
established by the City of Burbank.44 The legislative history 
argument in the dissent was bolstered by the required assumption 
that the historic police powers of the states are not to be 
superseded by a federal Act, unless such 'displacement is the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.45 It never has been 
contended that noise control is not encompassed within the 
traditional police powers. 
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Legislative history also was ignored in the determination of 
an action brought by franchisees of 7-Eleven convenience stores 
against their franchisor for violation of the California 
Franchise Investment Act. The action was commenced in the 
California Superior Court, and the franchisor sought arbitration 
of the controversies under the terms of an arbitration clause in 
the franchise agreements. The Supreme Court ultimately made a 
determination of preemption, holding that the Federal Arbitration 
Act established a national policy favoring arbitration and 
deprived the states of the authority to provide a judicial forum 
when the parties had agreed to arbitrate their differences.46 
The dissenting opinion, however, provided persuasive historical 
evidence that the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to be 
enforced only in the federal courts.47 The majority found such a 
direct and irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law 
that the Supremacy Clause was needed to resolve it. The dissent, 
relying on legislative history, found the federal law wholly 
inapplicable. That's what I call a difference of opinion! 
Courts have employed many strange modes of analysis, as we 
have seen, in pursuit of the elusive congressional intent. I 
think that the outer limits of preemption analysis were reached 
last December, when a court found that the absence of federal 
gasoline regulation manifested the intention of Congress to leave 
the field unregulated. The court was the Temporary Emergency 
Court of Appeals, which is charged with the enforcement of the 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973. When Congress 
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decided to deregulate gasoline prices and to permit free market 
forces to control, Puerto Rico reinstated its own price 
regulations. Several oil companies challenged these regulations 
and prevailed.48 The Court of Appeals drew its rationale for a 
finding of implied intent to preempt from a Supreme Court case in 
which the following statement was made: "[A] federal decision to 
forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative 
federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and 
in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision 
to regulate."49 The logical dissenter in the Puerto Rico case 
found it "paradoxical" that the expiration of temporary emergency 
federal measures should have the effect of permanently 
constraining the exercise of the police powers of state 
governments.50 Preemption jurisprudence indeed has entered the 
twilight zone! 
As the shadow of federal regulation has lengthened, 
supremacy problems have found their way into such diverse legal 
fields as torts,51 civil procedure,52 antitrust,53 patents,54 and 
environmental law.55 Supremacy questions have affected cases 
involving the regulation of public utilities, transportation, 
labor, navigation, securities and banking.56 Preemption issues 
are on the calendar at every Supreme Court Term. During the 
1985-1986 Term, the Court found that a Florida tax on aviation 
fuel was not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act,57 that North 
Carolina could impose an ad valorem tax on tobacco without 
contravening the federal statutory scheme governing 
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customs-bonded warehouses,58 that Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission power rates prevailed in a collision with rates fixed 
by the North Carolina Utilities Commission,59 and that states may 
establish telephone plant and equipment depreciation rules 
applicable to intrastate telephone service even though those 
rules conflict with federal rules applicable to interstate 
service.60 The 1986-1987 Term already has brought us an 
important decision holding that a California law requiring 
pregnancy leave and subsequent reinstatement to employment is not 
preempted by the Federal Pregnancy Act, which only forbids 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.61 
It cannot be denied that the Supreme Court has taken on a 
major share of the burden of adjusting and monitoring 
federal-state relations by an ad hoc process of decision making 
in preemption cases. In my opinion, the results have been mixed 
and state interests often have suffered in the process. There 
are those who are all too willing to leave the question of 
societal needs for federal intervention to the federal courts as 
a function of preemption jurisprudence".62 This is judicial 
policy-making at its worst, and I regard the concept as 
dangerous, undemocratic and violative of basic constitutional 
principles. Those who contend that the courts have a duty to 
apply the preemption doctrine to promote cooperation between 
state and federal governments63 mistake the judicial function as 
fully as those who look to the doctrine as a vehicle for 
reconciling competing state and federal interests.64 The 
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judicial role in applying the Supremacy Clause should be a 
limited one -- to declare federal legislation adopted under the 
powers granted to Congress by the Constitution supreme over any 
state law in actual collision with it. I suggest that a clear 
definition by Congress of the areas of regulation remaining to 
the states will in large part eliminate the confusion, 
inconsistency and burdensome caseloads that have been the 
hallmarks of preemption jurisprudence. I recommend the 
following: 
1. There should be established in each chamber of Congress 
a Standing Committee on State-Federal Relations. The excellent 
report entitled "The Status of Federalism in America" by the 
Working Group on Federalism of the Domestic Policy Council65 
suggests the establishment of federalism subcommittees of the 
judiciary committees in each House to review all proposed 
legislation with potentially adverse implications for state 
sovereignty. I believe that the dignity of federalism issues 
requires the appointment of a Standing Committee to be charged, 
among other things, with the duty of reviewing all legislation 
that might in any way touch upon areas of state concern. 
Included would be the responsibility for coordinating state and 
federal legislation and for maintaining an awareness of the 
constitutional limitations of congressional power. 
2. The Standing Committee would be required to solicit the 
views of the states, those representing state interests and other 
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concerned citizens. In the course of reviewing each piece of 
legislation involving areas of state concern and preemption 
possibilities, the spotlight of public opinion would be focused 
on the effect of the exercise of congressional power. Input from 
diverse sectors would assure full consideration by the Committees 
of the matters under review. Although this process may be 
criticized for being slow and cumbersome, it will serve to deter 
hastily drawn and ill-conceived legislation affecting state 
interests. It may also reveal that existing state regulation 
is adequate and that entry of Congress into the field is 
unnecessary. 
3. A detailed Report of the findings and recommendations of 
the Committees would be filed for each piece of legislation 
reviewed. The Domestic Policy Council calls for a "federalism 
assessment," but I think that the Committees can go much further. 
Their Reports should include the results of their research into 
existing and contemplated state legislation in the area under 
review and a compendium of the views expressed to the Committees 
through hearings and communications. Included in each Report 
would be specific language to be included in the legislation 
relative to the following matters: a statement of the outer 
limits of federal regulation in the area or field subject of the 
legislation; a clear delineation of that which remains subject to 
state regulation; and, if applicable, a description of specific 
types of existing state legislation to be displaced. The general 
savings clauses and the general supersedure clauses, as I have 
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demonstrated, do not always work, and these suggestions will go a 
long way toward eliminating preemption problems. 
4. The Committee should undertake a review of all past 
Supreme Court decisions applying the Supremacy Clause. Such a 
review will enable Congress to determine whether it disagrees 
with any previous preemption decision, and is not a difficult 
project in these days of computerized legal research. The 
process should follow that recommended for a study of new 
legislation. It is an advantage of the Supremacy Clause that 
Congress can overrule a Supreme Court decision on preemption by 
amending or repealing the federal legislation. The states, of 
course, have no such authority. In my own view, many of the 
decisions displacing state regulation were wrongly decided and 
have led to the extension of federal law into areas better 
regulated by the states. (Perhaps many of these areas are best 
left unregulated entirely.) Congress can do much to rectify the 
errors of the past. 
5. Legislation should be enacted to deprive federal 
agencies of their ability to preempt state authority by 
regulation. The Supreme Court has held that a federal agency 
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated 
authority may preempt state regulation.66 Aside from the 
constitutional questions posed by preemption by administrative 
regulation, sound policy dictates that so-called independent 
federal agencies, having diverse interests and agendas, should 
not be allowed to displace state law. I cannot agree that 
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administrative agencies have any role in balancing state and 
federal interests.67 Congress must reclaim its exclusive 
prerogative of deciding when state law is to be preempted. 
If my suggestions are adopted and greater responsibility for 
the preservation of federalism is shifted to Congress, I am 
confident that the states will once again be permitted to operate 
without interference in the areas in which they are most 
competent.68 I sincerely believe that Congress can assist in 
restoring the balance envisioned by the Founding Fathers when 
they created our federal system of government. By reducing the 
role of the courts in preemption litigation, Congress certainly 
can help to overcome preemptive strikes on state autonomy. It 
could thereby enable us to return to the Supremacy Clause 
interpretations of John Marshall. He was, after all, a pretty 
good Judge. But then, all he really had to go on was the written 
text of the United States Constitution. 
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